

Advocating the right to health care for every man, woman and child.

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June 19, 2006

VIA U.S Mail and Electronically

Alesssandro A. Iuppa, Superintendent Attn: Vanessa J. Leon Docket No. INS 06-900 Maine Bureau of Insurance 34 State House Station Gardiner, ME 04333-0034

IN RE: REVIEW OF AGGREGATE MEASURABLE COST SAVINGS DETERMINED BY DIRIGO HEALTH FOR THE SECONDASSESSMENT YEAR (2007)

Dear Superintendent Iuppa:

Please find enclosed for filing in the above captioned matter, two (2) copies of the following documents from Consumers for Affordable Health Care (C.A.H.C.):

SUMBITTED BY:

Joseph P. Ditré, Legal Counsel to Consumers for Affordable Health Care

DATE:

Monday, June 19, 2006

DOCUMENT TITLE:

C.A.H.C. Motion for Leave to Serve Informational Request and / or present evidence

DOCUMENT TYPE:

Informational Request

CONFIDENTIAL:

No

Thank you for your attention in this matter.

Respectfully submitte

Joseph P. Ditré, Esq.

Number 3719

Consumers for Affordable Health Care

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STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL AND FINANCIAL REGULATION BUREAU OF INSURANCE

IN RE: REVIEW OF AGGREGATE)	
MEASURABLE COST SAVINGS)	
DETERMINED BY DIRIGO HEALTH)	CAHC Motion For Leave
FOR THE SECOND ASSESSMENT YEAR)	to Serve Informational
)	Request And / Or Present
)	Evidence
)	
Docket No. INS-06-900)	

Pursuant to Sub-section E of the Superintendent's Notice of Pending Proceeding and Hearing, Consumers for Affordable Health Care ("CAHC") hereby requests leave to serve a limited information request upon the Dirigo Health agency and/or to present additional evidence.

Background

As more fully set forth in the June 6, 2006 Decision of the Board of Directors of the Dirigo Health Agency, the time limitations under which the agency and the Board acted precluded the introduction, at the hearing before the Board, of complete evidence in support of the determination of aggregate measurable cost savings. Thus, some savings were actually estimates based upon assumed data.

Nevertheless, the parties to this proceeding explicitly recognized that subsequent to the Board's determination, additional information would be forthcoming and would be presented to the Superintendent. See Transcript of the April 7, 2006 Hearing before the Honorable Donald H. Marden, Justice of the Superior Court, attached hereto, and submitted at the Board proceeding below as CAHC Exhibit #1. See e.g. p.50, lines 18-25; p. 47, lines 3-15; p.60, lines 7-17.

In addition, both at the hearing before the Board and in the deliberations of the Board, both witnesses and the Board itself stated that the information presented was preliminary and would need to be supplemented in order for the Superintendent to make his determination as to whether the Board's determination was "reasonable." See, e.g., "Dirigo Health Savings Offset Payment Year 2 Methodology Supplement": Record ("R"). 1077, 1079, 1080, 1086-1088, 1101-1103, R.1051, Lines 227-228; 236-269; 415-419; R. at 1057; 1058-59; 1066 Lines 421-426; R. 1066; R. 5220; R. 5520-221; R. 5032; R. 5050; R. 4980.

The Board also noted in its Decision that the determination of "savings from CMAD is based upon available date and recognizes that there may be additional data available to include in the calculation when the Superintendent of Insurance undertakes his review of the Board's determination." Board Decision at n.5

The Superintendent in his Review of Aggregate Measurable Cost Savings Determined By Dirigo Health For The First Assessment Year permitted the introduction of evidence which was not previously presented to the Board. While the Board's proceeding for Year 2 was far more extensive than the Year 1 proceeding, nevertheless full and complete information, which is now available, should, in fairness to the parties, to the public and to insure the integrity of this process, be now considered.

Finally, as was done in the First Assessment Year proceeding before the Superintendent, additional analysis of the respective parties' evidence is essential to a full and fair process. Thus, for example, the Chamber presented evidence and testimony at the Board Hearing which was given only cursory attention, given the Board's compressed time schedule. One piece of evidence, which was scarcely mentioned at the hearing, has turned out to be crucial to the Board's Decision. Specifically, as noted at Page 14 of the Decision, The Board ended up placing substantial reliance upon Chamber Exhibit #21, Table 7 showing a 3 year median growth rate of 4.7%. The Board's use of this Exhibit resulted in a substantial reduction of savings in CMAD, as compared with the amount that the Agency's expert witness had previously presented.

For the reasons set forth above, CAHC seeks leave to obtain new evidence, i.e. evidence which was not previously available, which DHA now has in its possession and which is highly relevant to the determination which the Superintendent must make. The evidence is not repetitious since it has not been previously presented. The evidence will not delay the proceedings since it is readily available.

Information Request

The information sought from the Dirigo Health Agency is as follows:

- 1. Any expert analyses and/or reports, produced subsequent to the hearing before the Board and which is relevant to the Board's Decision dated June 6, 2006 regarding the calculation of CMAD, specifically the use of a 3-year median rate of growth as compared to a 3-year average rate of growth as set forth in Chamber Exhibit #21. CAHC believes that the DHA currently has in its possession such a report or analysis, that such evidence will demonstrate that use of the median as used in Chamber's Exhibit #21 does not provide a reasonable basis upon which to determine savings in CMAD. Furthermore, the analysis presents a means to determine what methodology is reasonable to determine CMAD. Therefore, the report is highly relevant to the issue before the Superintendent.
- 2. New information in the possession of the DHA which information was not available at the time of the hearing before the Board and that is relevant to the calculation of CMAD, CON/CIF, and the Uninsured. Included within this request are any analyses of that new information. It is CAHC's understanding that this information and analysis is currently

available, is not repetitious of previously presented evidence, i.e. it is new evidence, and that this new evidence will demonstrate additional savings in these areas.

Dated: Monday, June 19, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph P. Ditré Esq., Bar #3719

Executive Director

Consumers for Affordable Health Care

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Certificate of Service

I, Joseph P. Ditré, Esq., certify that the foregoing C.A.H.C. Motion for Leave to Serve Informational Request and/or Present Evidence was served this day upon the following parties via U.S. mail and electronically.

Alessandro A. Iuppa, Superintendent

Attn: Vanessa J. Leon Docket No. INS-06-900 124 Northern Avenue Gardiner, ME 04333-00034

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Dated: Monday, June 19, 2006

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Respectfully submitted,

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Executive Director

Consumers for Affordable Health Care

Counsel to

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EXHIBIT # 1
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     STATE OF MAINE
                                        SUPERIOR COURT
                                       Civil Action
     KENNEBEC, ss.
                                        Docket No. AP-06-26
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     MAINE ASSOCIATION OF
7
     HEALTH PLANS, et al.,
               Plaintiffs,
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          V
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     DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY
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     BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
               Defendant.
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12
                                 HEARING
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     BEFORE:
15
               The Honorable Donald H. Marden
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               Justice of the Superior Court
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18
                       Kennebec County Courthouse
95 State Street
19
                             Augusta, Maine
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                              April 7, 2006
                                9:40 A.M.
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CONSUMERS FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE

COPY

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3	APPEARANCES:
4	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: CHRISTOPHER T. ROACH, ESQ. MICHAEL D. FRINK, ESQ.
5	BRUCE C. GERRITY, ESO. WILLIAM H. STILES, ESQ.
6	
7	FOR THE DEFENDANT: ELIZABETH J. WYMAN, ESQ. JOSEPH DITRE, ESQ.
8	
9	Towards T. Goods
10	Janette L. Cook Official Court Reporter
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THE COURT: Thank you, please be seated. 2 Good morning. 3 MS. WYMAN: Good morning. 4 MR. ROACH: Good morning, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: A familiar cast of 6 characters, if you will excuse the expression. 7 Good morning again. I think probably for 8 starters we ought to enter our appearance for 9 the record, so that that is clear. If the 10 petitioners would start, please, 11 MR. ROACH: Good morning, Your Honor, 12 Chris Roach from Pierce, Atwood on behalf of 13 petitioner Anthem Health Plans of Maine. THE COURT: Thank you. 14 MR. FRINK: Good morning, Your Honor. 15 16 Michael Frink from Curtis, Thaxter on the behalf 17 of the Maine Association of Health Plans. MR. GERRITY: Good morning. Bruce 18 19 Gerrity on behalf of Maine Automobile Dealers 20 Insurance Trust. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 MR. STILES: Good morning, William Stiles from Verrill, Dana, here on behalf of the Maine State Chamber of Commerce. 24 25 THE COURT: Thank you. 4

agency action. The reply brief of the petitioner was received I guess yesterday, I saw it first this morning. It seems to make clear that they are proceeding on the basis of Sub 2 of 11,001, which in effect is challenging the failure or refusal of the agency to act. 8 And recognizing that I haven't digested 9 all of the key details of the issues that have been presented, but it appears, then, that the 10 question before the Court as a threshold 11 question is whether the Court has jurisdiction 12 under 11,001, Sub 2, and if so, what the standard of review should be. I believe Mr. 14 Ditre has suggested that there must be a showing 15 of irreparable harm, at least he has briefed 16 that issue. 17 So I guess I would first ask petitioner, 18 19 whomever wishes to be the spokesman in this 20 regard, to address the issue of jurisdiction. 21 MR. ROACH: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. 22 As previously indicated, Your Honor, my 23 name is Chris Roach, I'm from Pierce, Atwood and 24 I'm here on behalf of petitioner, Anthem Health

there was a briefing of the issue of final

Elizabeth Wyman, I'm an assistant attorney general, I'm here on behalf of the Dirigo Health Board. MR. DITRE: Good morning, Your Honor. I'm Joe Ditre and I'm serving as counsel for Consumers of Affordable Health Carriers. THE COURT: Good morning, Joe. MR. DITRE: Good morning. THE COURT: Okay. The record should be clear on this matter, which is AP 2006-26, that this is pretty of much an -- an expedited proceeding and for that reason did not notice anyone to be responsible for addressing the merits of the underlying case but to simply address the procedural issues. Some of the material that has been submitted does address the underlying case, which is helpful, I'm not

MS. WYMAN: Good morning, Your Honor.

make it clear that I'm not holding any -- any party to this being the determinative hearing for that purpose. There's been an issue raised as to whether or not the Court has jurisdiction under Title 5, 11,000, of the APA, and originally

complaining, but I - I - I think I need to

6 like to briefly go through four different areas that I would like to discuss with the Court this morning, because I think it may be helpful for context. 5 In the first instance to talk about why it is that the petitioners are here and what

Plans of Maine. If I could, Your Honor, I'd

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relief we're seeking, because I think that's related in part to the jurisdictional question. Secondly, to go through the jurisdictional issues that have been raised. Our intention is 10 to be rather brief in that regard because I 11 12 think our reply lays out in great detail why it 13 is that we think that they -- that the respondent DHA board is looking at the wrong 15 piece of the statute. Third, I'd like to deal 16 with the motion to expedite, which again, Your Honor, in our view has been largely mooted by 17 the filing of -- of briefs by -- by all sides on 18 the issues that are really relevant to this 19 20 particular appeal.

We certainly have an interest, Your 22 Honor, on petitioner's side in a prompt resolution for the reasons set forth both in our petition and in our motion to expedite and certainly feel that the Court has now before it

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full briefing on that issue.

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Lastly, should the Court wish to indulge us to any degree on the ments, we're certainly fully prepared on our side of the table to discuss what we think is the ultimate issue in 6 this case, which is whether the deadlines within 24A M.R.S.A. 6913(1)(A), are mandatory or directory. We think that's the only issue really before the Court and we're certainly prepared to discuss those.

11 Starting first with why it is that we are 12 before Your Honor, this case is rather straight forward. There are two statutory requirements 13 that the DHA board has failed to comply with. 14 15 In Section 6913(1)(A), they are required to hold 16 a hearing and to determine the aggregate measurable cost savings no later than April 1st. 17 18 and in this case, no later than April 1, 2006. 19 Rather than complying with those statutory 20 obligations that are very clear, and no one 21 here, to my knowledge, is arguing that they 22 aren't, but rather than comply with those clear statutory requirements, the Board refused or failed to act and instead issued a decision that 25 essentially would cross out the April 1st

deadline that was imposed by the legislature and 1 2 impose instead an April 15, 2006 -- I apologize. an August 15, 2006, deadline to hold the hearing 3 and no indication whatsoever on when it would be 4 5 that they would actually issue a determination 6 of aggregate measurable costs.

Now below, Your Honor, all the petitioners have explained why in our view that was unlawful, why the legislature made clear what it wanted the DHA Board to do and offered up alternatives to -- to accomplish that. They - they instead refused and issued their determination that essentially ignores those requests and those requirements under 6913(1)(A).

The petitioners thereafter did what this very Court and the Law Court in the past directed that it do, if you have agency inaction, you have to go to court to address that. Otherwise you can't complain later. That is what the -- the case law stands for. That's what Bredbury stands for, that's what this -this county's decision in Concannon stands for.

24 You must go -- your redress if you are petitioners facing inaction by an agency is to

go to the Court to require them to comply. We 1 2 have done that.

3 And again, the issue before the Court is, in my view, rather plain, are the deadlines 5 mandatory or are they directory. If they're 6 mandatory, the Board won't have the power to issue a valid determination with regard to aggregate measurable costs because they have refused to issue one by April 1st. Even if it's directory, though, this Court and others in the 10 past have made absolutely clear that the agency 11 12 is without power to ignore statutory deadlines. I think this Court most recently in McGee upheld 13 that foundational principle. Where the deadline 15 says shall, that means something. The agency

We turn next to the issue of jurisdiction and the issues that have been raised by the DHA Board. In response to --

has no power to simply ignore it.

THE COURT: You wanted to refer under the 20 21 statutes to two deadlines -- deadlines on two 22 issues that the Board had.

23 MR. ROACH: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: One was the aggregate 24

25 measurable cost savings, the other one was what,

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the offset?

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MR. ROACH: No, the other is - the other is to hold a hearing.

THE COURT: The hearing.

MR. ROACH: The hearing must necessarily predate in sequence the determination of 7 aggregate measurable cost. And so they must have held the hearing and they must have determined aggregate measurable cost no later 10 than April 1st under the statute.

Now, Your Honor, turning next to the jurisdictional argument, we frankly I don't think believe we would see what we saw in response to our -- to our petition and to our briefs, both of which made clear that we were pursuing action by this Court based on the inaction of the Board under Section 5 M.R.S.A. 11,001, Sub 2, which clearly applies to this type of situation. We're dealing here with inaction by the Board, a failure or a refusal to adhere to a statutory deadline, and then we go to court as directed by -- both by the plain language of the statute and the Court.

24 In response, the DHA Board without even citing the section under which we have -- we

have sought this Court's redress said instead that this is not final agency action. With all 3 respect, that's right, it isn't final agency action, it is not action at all. And that's precisely why we are here in front of the Court 5 6 and precisely why the legislature set out in 5 7 M.R.S.A. 11,001 Sub 2 that that particular 8 section is applicable for redress when there's 9 agency inaction. That's what we have here, is

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22 23 inaction.

The respondents DHA Board would suggest, 12 as they apparently have in their brief, that the Court ignore that provision, simply erase it from -- from the books of the legislature. I 15 would submit, Your Honor, that although 16 baffling, that is consistent with their position 17 ultimately on whether or not they needed to hold 18 a hearing and issue a determination. They have. as they did below, when they erased the statutory requirement to hold a hearing and to issue their determination by April 1st, they would now have this Court erase the requirement -- the -- the right that the petitioners have to come in and seek redress for their inaction.

require that they comply with the statute.

1 2 The third issue that I told the Court 3 that I wanted to address was the motion to expedite. Again, in our view, Your Honor, this 4 has been largely mooted by the fact that the DHA Board, which is the real respondent in this 6 case, has already submitted a brief that deals both with jurisdiction and with the merits of 9 the case in a way that they apparently feel was 10 satisfactory. I think they got ultimately --

11 although part one in our view is irrelevant, because it deals with final agency action, part 12 two deals with directory versus mandatory. They 13

14 make the argument that the statute should be 15 directory.

What they leave out is the obvious conclusion. We agree that this comes down to is the deadline mandatory or is it directory. Where we disagree is apparently they would view directory as akin to discretionary. There is no support in the law for that proposition. And I would point the Court to its recent decision in

23 McGee, to this county's decision in the

Concannon case, where the Court made absolutely 24 25

clear what the prior precedents from the Law

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I would ask the Court only -- under what circumstances I would ask -- I would ask respondents to address, under what circumstances could petitioners in our situation faced with inaction by an agency attempt to get redress in Court if not for 5 M.R.S.A. 11,001 Sub 2. That 7 is precisely what this particular provision is for, that is what we have sought relief under. Again, it's baffling to me having not only cited it but quoted it in our petition and in our briefs that it's not addressed at all, at all in their papers. And instead, they've tried to focus the Court on final agency action.

Again, we did what we were supposed to do under the -- the existing statutory construct and under the prior precedent both from the Law Court and from this Court. It -- in my view it couldn't be more clear.

I would suggest to the Court that if the Court had any doubt but that it needed to issue an order to require an agency to comply with the statutory obligation, their response to our petition and to our briefs reinforces that if

24 there's to be any meaningful process here, the 25 Court is going to have to step in, intercede and Court mean. They don't mean that the agency can

simply ignore the statutory deadlines. They

mean that if they are ignored and there is no

consequence, then perhaps the agency will not be 4

prohibited from making whatever determination it

was supposed to make but instead they must --

they must do so immediately. It's not a free

pass. Directory does not mean discretionary. I

think that we've - we have fully briefed those 9 10 issues and we are certainly prepared to argue

11 them today.

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Again, I - I understand the Court's admonition on the ments of the case and so I won't address them further unless the Court has -- has specific questions about them. But certainly at bottom, Your Honor, our view is that it doesn't make any difference. It doesn't make any difference to this particular petitioner whether these deadlines are deemed mandatory or whether they're deemed directory. The Board's refusal to act is unlawful.

At best -- or at worst, depending on which case you're in, they would be prevented from making the aggregate measurable cost savings determination. But at best, at best

auestion. I get the impression from the filings

that both parties seem to think this statute is

unenforceable in terms of the deadlines.

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they have to comply now. They have to hold a hearing that's required by the legislature now. 3 Your Honor, again, we don't have --THE COURT: So even - I wasn't clear. 5 they even continued the hearing? MR. ROACH: I'm sorry, Your Honor, what? 6 7 THE COURT: in addition to the decision, they continued the hearing as well? 8 9 MR. ROACH: They did continue -- they --THE COURT: Doesn't the statute say that 10 11 they may hold a hearing but they're not required to. 12 13 MR. ROACH: I don't believe so. Your 14 Honor. THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. ROACH: I believe that the statute 16 says that after holding a hearing or after an 17 18 opportunity for a hearing --THE COURT: Opportunity for a hearing. 19 20 MR. ROACH: Opportunity for a hearing. Well, we've been afforded no opportunity for a 21 22 hearing. THE COURT: Okay. 23 24 MR. ROACH: And certainly, Your Honor, I 25 don't think that the DHA Board, but I will leave

That -- that they can't get the material or the information necessary by -- to make a decision April 1st and you can't do your job, or your clients can't do their job if they don't make the April 1st. And so - I seem to see that in the -- in the briefings. What's your 10 understanding? MR. ROACH: I think -- I think it's a 11 good question, Your Honor. I think that -- that 12 13 the answer to it really is -- lies in if they follow the - the procedures that are set out by 14 the legislature - they would have the Court I 15 16 think be under the misimpression, intentional or not, that their only opportunity to -- to make 17 this determination A, is April 1st. As a 18 practical matter, their determination, their 19 20 supporting information, go in front of the superintendent of insurance. I mean this is 22 literally -- this determination by the Board is the tip off in the game. I mean this is --23 24 THE COURT: Right. MR. ROACH: The game starts, they make 25

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it to them to make this argument, I don't think 2 that the DHA Board would suggest they weren't required to hold a hearing. They issued a 4 notice of pending proceeding and hearing in this 5 matter, they issued a procedural order. Both of 8 those documents were for the purpose of holding the hearing that they understood were required B under the statute.

I would also note that in both of those 10 documents, as well as in their response to our 11 request to have a brief period of discovery, we were admonished, the petitioners were admonished 12 by the DHA Board when it said that it had to 13 hold the hearing and issue its determination not 14 15 later than April 1st. They now have -- have not only ignored that statutory requirement but 16 ignored their own prior writings, which were 17 18 literally, you know, six to eight weeks ago. 19 They have taken the position that they 20 understood that they were required to make the 21 determination, they failed to make the

22 determination, and we're just simply asking the 23 Court to require them to do so. 24 THE COURT: Okay, Without -- without getting into the merits but just as a threshold

the aggregate measurable cost determination,

within a month they have to supply that

information and determination to the

superintendent. We then have an adjudicatory

process. If they think that there's information

that they don't have, that they don't have today

that is actually relevant and could --- and could

8 be relevant to one of the cost saving measures.

9 they can certainly attempt to put it in in front

of the superintendent. This is not a -- this is 10

not a situation in which they would be forever

12 closed or prevented under the statute from doing

13 SO.

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The other piece that I will say is that the legislature -- I think, the legislative framework fits nicely and I think recognizes that this is a lengthy process. There are multiple steps here that have to be undertaken before you actually get to a savings offset payment. It made perfect sense to start in April, that leads to a decision by the a determination by the DHA Board of the savings

superintendent by mid June, which then leads to 22

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offset payment, which then can be used in rate 25

making. I mean it is very -- it is very

- logical. And in fact, Your Honor, even if they
- were foreclosed from putting any information
- into the record, into the determination of
- aggregate measurable cost after April 1, that's
- what the legislature said. The DHA Board has 5
- decided that it needs this information in order
- 7
- to include it in and among certain cost saving 8 measures. They have most of the information.
- 9 They already have most of the information to do
- 10 this.

11 Not only have they not made any determination, they haven't supplied any of the 12 information. I mean they have not -- in McGee 13

14 the issue was substantial compliance. And even 15 there the Court said, would the -- would the

16 agency simply hold that none of these deadlines.

17 mean anything, that it has the discretion to simply ignore the statutory deadlines. Even 18

under those circumstances the Court raised those 19

20 questions.

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In this case you can't even call this an attempt at compliance, never mind substantial

compliance. We have the ability to do the 23

methodologies for the aggregate measurable 24

25 costs, that's been made clear by their own

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- experts. We have -- the vast majority of the 1
- data is available. I I don't know that
- anyone can dispute that. They may dispute 3
- whether or not they want to populate the spread
- sheets that are necessary to do these
- 6 calculations, I'm not sure what their -- what
- 7 their argument would be on why they can't
- provide information today and go forward today.
- But certainly it is -- it is in no way
- sufficient to override the legislative mandate 10
- here. 11

Even if that were relevant, which in our 12

- 13 view it isn't relevant to making the discreet
- determination that we're asking you to make, 14
- which is it the deadline mandatory or is it 15
- directory. There is no balancing of harms 16
- analysis that's done here. With all due 17
- 18 respect, there is no irreparable harm standard.
- There is no ripeness standard. There is --19
- there is the statute which says for inaction 20
- 21 petitioners may seek redress. And then there
- are the -- the decisions which say the same 22
- 23 thing. For inaction, petitioners may seek
- 24 redress and request that the Court order them to
- 25 comply.

THE COURT: Under the statutory scheme.

2 are the insurers required to get their data to

the Board -- their year end data to the Board by

March 1st? Is that your understanding?

MR. ROACH: Which year end data are you

6 referring to, Your Honor?

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THE COURT: Whatever it is the Board uses to determine the aggregate measurable cost savinos.

9 10 MR. ROACH: It's a good question. They use - they use different pieces of data. In 11

the first instance they use a -13 THE COURT: But my question is, do the 14 insurers have a deadline of March 1st to provide certain information to the Board under this 15 16 statute.

MR. ROACH: I'm not aware. Your Honor --I - or at least I didn't focus on it for this 18 19 hearing, of a provision that requires the insurance companies to get to - to provide information to the Board that we've not 21 22 provided.

THE COURT: No. I'm not - I'm trying to determine whether or not this Board has a - has a window of 30 days to hold a hearing and make

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1 this decision. Is that - is that not the case?

MR. ROACH: That is not the case.

3 THE COURT: Okay. That answers my question. 4

MR. ROACH: I apologize, I wasn't -

THE COURT: I'll let the Board explain.

MR. ROACH: Let them explain that, but I

apologize, I wasn't understanding that. This proceeding was started up, the DHA Board's

consultant in the first instance determined what 10

11 it felt to be the appropriate methodology, they

shared those with us, albeit -- albeit very late

and not in accordance with the procedural order

14 by the Board, and then this proceeding was

called to a halt by virtue of the continuance. 15

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROACH: It's an unlawful continuance.

18 We would ask that the Court make the

19 determination about whether or not this is

20 mandatory or directory, and at the very least

21 order that they comply with the statute and hold 22 the hearing immediately.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, 23

24 MR. ROACH: Thank you, Your Honor.

25 THE COURT: Ms. Wyman.

MS. WYMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. I'm here on behalf of the Dirigo Health Board. Mr. Laubenstein, who submitted the brief, was unable to be here.

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I just want to pick up on that last point, that this was a quote, unlawful continuance, unquote. The reason why we take the position that Section 11,001 Subsection 2 doesn't apply is because we are in the middle of an administrative process.

Section 11,001(1), Subsection 1, is the 11 12 section of the APA that applies here, Your Honor. And specifically the language in that section which reads, preliminary, procedural 15 intermediate or other nonfinal agency action 16 shall be independently reviewable only if review of the final agency action would not provide an 18 adequate remedy. That's what's before the Court today. It's not failure of Dirigo Health Board 19 20 to act. In fact it was the Dirigo Health 21 Board's continuance, order of continuance, which triggered this - this 80-C appeal. They don't

like the fact that the Board has already looked 23 24 at the issue of whether it can issue a

25 continuance and interpreting its own statute,

has determined that it can.

1 It has not ignored the April 1st 2 3 deadline. The April 1st deadline has been uppermost in the mind of the agency and the 5 Board. What they did is made a determination that they could not do the work that they needed 6 to do under the statute, and that's to determine measurable cost savings by the April 1st 8 9 deadline. And they have a presiding officer who 10 issued a recommended decision, after the issue was fully briefed, and that recommended 11 decision, which was submitted to this Court as 12 part of this record, was adopted by the Board. 13 That is agency action. It's not final agency 14 action, but it's agency action. It's not 15

The case they cite -- or cases that they cite under Subsection 2 involve an agency simply doing nothing, not acting on an application, not taking any action whatsoever. Here you're in the middle of - of an administrative process. You've got a presiding officer, you've got a Board who has issued a continuance to hold the hearing.

THE COURT: At what point in time does it

become inaction? 1

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MS, WYMAN: It becomes -- we have an 2 action here that they have appealed. It's a 3 procedural nonfinal agency action. They do have the right to come to this Court under Subsection 1 and ask this Court to look at that determination and make a decision as to whether it meets the standard, and that is whether it shall be independently reviewable, only if review of the final agency action would not 10 provide an adequate remedy. 11

THE COURT: But --

MS, WYMAN: And here we say it does, because the issue is not ripe. This mandatory directory issue, they have fully preserved that issue for appeal. And when the Board has made its final determination on final agency action, we assume they will appeal on that basis.

THE COURT: But for purposes of the argument -

MS. WYMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- at what point in continuances by the Board does it become failure to act?

MS. WYMAN: Then it would be if they -

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for example, after -- they -- in the decision that was adopted by the Board, they said that they would have a hearing no later than August 15th. 4 5 THE COURT: What if they continue that 6 hearing? 7

MS. WYMAN: Then I think that you might be getting into a situation where you truly had agency inaction.

THE COURT: How do I determine that? MS. WYMAN: Well, you have to look at whether the Board is acting in a way that meets the standard under Subsection 2, which would be 13 whether there has been complete inaction on the part of the agency which then prejudices the rights of the parties. That hasn't happened here. What you have is a procedural order. And they have the right -- they want very much for this Court --

THE COURT: But an August continuance would be a procedural order, too, as would a November, as would a December. I'm trying to find out if these are simply procedural --

MS. WYMAN: Right. 24

25 THE COURT: - and not subject to Sub 2.

inaction.

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MS. WYMAN: We're not there yet, we're 2 not even close to being there.

THE COURT: When do we get there? MS. WYMAN: If they - and you have to understand. I'm not as intimately familiar with the statute as others in this room.

THE COURT: I certainly am but you know more about it than I do.

9 MS. WYMAN: We can have a good 10 conversation about this. I know nothing about 11

But my understanding is if they were unable to perhaps in the fall, which is the period of time -- last year, for example, they did all of this, the superintendent of insurance issued its decision on October 29th, and that gave the parties sufficient time to do what they needed to do to get the rates in place. If it went beyond that point, I would say it was agency inaction, potentially.

But at this point what you have is the Board is trying to do what it needs to do in recognition that there's an issue out there as to whether the April 1st deadline is directory or mandatory. We take the position that it's

what the petitioners wanted, but in granting the 2 continuance of the proceeding, they in fact did 3

A refusal to act, on the other hand, and 4 5 I would distinguish this from what the petitioners just argued, that they said it's either a refusal or a failure, a refusal is when they deny, for example, an approval of an application or a permit or at some -- something 9 10 like that. And that didn't happen here.

THE COURT: No, because a denial would be an act.

MS. WYMAN: And a denial is an act. 13 14 THE COURT: So that wouldn't be a refusal. 15 to act?

MS, WYMAN: If they refuse what the -what the -- if they refused what the applicant was asking for -- for example, in the EMMC case and in various cases cited by the applicants, these are requests for approval and the - and the request for approval was denied, it was 21 refused, in essence. So we don't have either of 22 those things here, what we have -- and we don't 24 have inaction, this is not inaction. There was

25 a recommended hearing here, a decision which was

directory. But we understand that that's an 1

issue that will be on appeal when it's ripe.

It's not ripe at this moment. And that's why we

4 briefed it under 11,001 Subsection 1 and not 2.

Subsection 2 doesn't apply here.

6 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WYMAN: Thank you.

8 THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ROACH: Mr. Ditre, do you wish to be

heard? 10

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11 MR. DITRE: Yes, sir. Your Honor, I'm 12 not going to repeat what you've already heard. but one thing, I wanted to answer a couple of 13

14 the questions you just brought up. 15

But before doing so, I'd just like to say that this morning when I gave my daughter breakfast, it was a pear, and she bit into it and she said this is so not ripe. And I said exactly. And she looked back, and she was like, what is he talking about. I was thinking about this case of course.

21 Just as Ms. Wyman just said, this is not 22 a refusal to act, this is not a failure to act. 23 A failure to act is no action. Here the Board 24 did take action. The action might not have been

adopted by the Board that continued the hearing because the Board determined that they did not

have sufficient information which will only be

available, most of which was -- or some of which

will only be available in June, that they didn't

6 have enough information -

THE COURT: And tell me about that information. I know that's been discussed, but I don't understand it. What kind of information are we talking about?

MR. DITRE: There's multiple - and this really gets into some of the merits, but 12 basically the Board needs to determine aggregate measurable cost savings. These are complex calculations that involve the capital investment fund, operating margins by hospitals, bad debt and charity care. I mean there are multiple calculations using different pieces of information, some of which are in the medicare cost reports, some of which are in medicaid reports, some of which are the Maine Health Data Organization, I mean these are complex calculations that the Board must make.

In their own determination they decided that they didn't have data that would provide --

enable them to make an accurate and -- decision. and therefore it would not be fair and equitable to the people if they came up with a decision that underestimated in essence the savings 5 offset payment. Then in essence people who need 6 health insurance that are funded by, once an 7 assessment is placed - after this calculation 8 is done, there is another two steps that happen. 9 THE COURT: Right.

MR. DITRE: The superintendent basically has to determine that there is reasonable evidence and support in the record for what the Board determined to be the savings. So that's another proceeding. And then after that, the Board then determines what is the level of

THE COURT: Okav.

assessment

MR. DITRE: And basically - so we're so far removed from where they -- where any prejudice or harm may come, because all they're doing now is saying that we don't have the data that we need in order to make a determination.

23 And that's basically a -- that's within -- to be

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THE COURT: Well, what happened to that

concept when the legislature created April 1st? 2 MR. DITRE: What happened to -3 THE COURT: I mean were they aware that all of this information was not going to be

available until after April 1st.

MR. DITRE: You know, I don't know what they were aware of. Your Honor, it's hard to say. The legislative process -- as you can see. this is where I'm going back to -- is

unpredictable. 10

> But I guess the other thing that I -- i just wanted to point out is - is this. I mean the agency has basically made a factual determination which we believe should be accorded deference, that they didn't have the information that they needed.

They also have -- there are numerous steps that will occur later that -- that give the opportunity to the petitioners to basically get what they need. In other words, by this decision of the savings offset payment, all it is is a calculation of how much has been saved. Later the superintendent has to make a

23 determination of whether there's reasonable 24 25 evidence to support that.

1 So, for example, the superintendent could

say, I don't find evidence to support this and

there are no savings here. There's no harm.

Later the Board can say -- even if there were savings found, they could reduce that amount,

because it's capped by three different

provisions within the - within the actual

8 statute. It says the savings can't be greater

9 than the actual savings, that's the first cap.

10 The savings cannot exceed -- the assessment on

the petitioner's cannot exceed 4 percent of paid 12 claims or the budget of the agency, the

13 budgetary needs of the agency. So we are very

far away from where an actual determination

15 would be to basically prejudice the petitioners 18

in any way.

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17 So it's our position that in essence this 18 is not a refusal to act, this is not a -- a

19 failure to act, this is not inaction. They

20 acted. It was the granting of a continuance.

And no matter how the petitioners try to

22 characterize this as an action, it's - it's

23 simply a procedural decision. And then like all

procedural decisions, then basically -- they --24

they -- it's not final agency action and they

have the ability at the end of the hearing process basically to appeal that decision.

THE COURT: Well, there are a number of steps in this process.

MR. DITRE: Yes, there are, sir.

THE COURT: And obviously one is dependent upon the other. I'll ask you the same question I asked Ms. Wyman. At what point does the procedure become substantive, which we know can happen?

MR. DITRE: Sure. And in the cases that they cited, again there was inaction, there was 12 no action taken. And those cases had gone on for literally years. There was -- I think there was one in which there was 128 days after the statutory deadline, 128 days later they still had not acted. In other cases there are years, literally, where the agency does not take action. And I would say at that point you're -but I would ask this question, Your Honor, what

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21 would be the interest of the agency which

basically survives on the subsidies that come

23 from the assessment to not act here? In essence

24 no one would get coverage under the Dirigo

Health program, none of the people who are

1 uninsured or underinsured would get coverage 2 under Dirigo if the agency failed to act and kept on extending the deadlines, because it's not in their interest to do so, because they want -- their purpose is to provide people who 6 are uninsured and underinsured with affordable 7 quality health coverage that is subsidized, and the subsidies come from the assessment that 8 comes two steps after where we're at now. 9

10 THE COURT: But -- and I'm being the devil's advocate here just to try to understand 11 12 this, as I understand the process, it is the 13 responsibility of the -- the petitioners, the 14 insurers, to negotiate with the health providers 15 a -- a cost savings -- the whole business of 16 cost shifting and everything else, that is, the 17 savings that can be realized in order to pay for this extended coverage. Obviously there's a 18 19 process that they have to go through which has a 20 time element to it. I don't know whether 21 there's agreement -- I -- all I know is what I 22 read in the paper, as to whether or not there is 23 agreement that the companies have the right 24 after the analysis of cost savings to then ask for rate relief. But assuming that they do, 25

actually how they can get relief even if they 1

2 were assessed as a result of three steps, four

steps, five steps down the line. In fact the

Dirigo statute says that they don't have to pay

the assessment until the close of -- 60 days

after the close of the quarter in which they're

required to pay the assessment. So they have --

so, for example, if the first quarter of the

assessment for this proceeding that we're now in

is January through March of '07, they have to 10 11 make the payment in -- within the close of 60

12 days of that, which would be somewhere in May. 13

And so again, we're so far away from a ripeness of this issue, because all we're at is 14 15 the point where we're determining what are the 16 savings. And the agency is simply saying in its 17 decision, determination, they don't have the 18 information that they need to make that. In 19 fact I would - I would argue that the most 20 relevant piece of -- of -- for -- to answer all 21 the questions here is really in the Board's decision, in Section 3 of it, in which they basically say they can't make an accurate decision of that aggregate measurable cost saving because they don't have the information

then that has a process.

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At some point isn't it clear that you're backing up the people who are supposed to be implementing these savings to a point where they can't get relief and now you've got - you're in a confiscatory type of situation?

MR. DITRE: No. Your Honor, actually. With regards to the -- that's -- that's -that's actually an issue that is now over in the state legislature, which is a completely separate from this.

THE COURT: Okay. MR. DITRE: In essence in the statute. the -- the insurers, who are assessed, if they -- under the statute. What they have to do 16 in the small group statute and the nongroup statute, it requires that an applicant that adjust its rates shall account for, these are the actual words, account for the savings offset payment or the recovery of a savings offset payment, and that's in Section 2736 of the nongroup statute and 2808-B of the small group

statute, that they shall account for the savings 24 offset payment or the recovery of that. 25

They -- what you're pointing out is

that they need. They believe that the April 1st deadline, that the legislature didn't intend the

April 1st deadline to result in a decision that would be incomplete or outdated.

And so, you know - and the other thing 6 that I think is very important to understand in terms of this, because I heard Mr. Roach talking 8 about a time frame which basically is his

construct, but this - this decision says that

they have - they shall hear this - continue

11 the adjudicatory proceeding not later than August the 15th. So they can -- once they get

those medicare cost reports, for example, in 13

14 June, that's the earliest that they may be

15 available, that they need, then they can proceed

with a hearing sometime in June or July. So

17 it's not - they're building sort of a --

18 they're constructing the worst case scenario at

the outset of everything, when in fact it might 19 20 proceed much more quickly, that's why we really

21 believe that this is not ripe for action here.

22 THE COURT: When did they anticipate that 23 they were going to get the information 24

necessary? I mean how realistic is a possible 25 June hearing?

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MR. DITRE: I believe that the decision says that at earliest that the information that they believe would be needed would be June. So

I don't know the answer to your question --

THE COURT: Okav.

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5 6 MR. DITRE: - in terms of - again. there are multiple - I mean the petitioners would argue that -- that the only savings under 9 the Dirigo program that can be calculated are 10 reduction in bad debt or charity care as a 11 result of the operation of the program or expansions of medicaid, that's been their point 13 of view. They have I think three or four cases 14 filed in the Cumberland County Court, I think they've got another four filed here, and that

15 16 will be decided. But the Dirigo Health Agency

17 argues that aggregate measurable cost savings 18

are not just those of the reduction of bad debt.

19 and charity care, it includes the operation --20

the reduction in operating margins at the 21 hospitals, the price reductions, the charge

22 reductions by the hospitals, any savings as a

23 result of the certificate of need provisions

24 that basically constrain spending on new

25 buildings and new equipment and new

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technologies, et cetera, those are all things 1 that need to be considered. And that information is also part of the information that they need.

THE COURT: Another question which isn't jurisdictional and I probably shouldn't be asking it, but what is the motivation for the hospitals? Is this a third-party-payer situation? What is their motivation to pass on those savings?

MR. DITRE: I think that because - when 12 you reduce prices. I believe this is -- if prices were reduced, then those savings would result in lower premiums as well as more --15 which would then result in more people having access to affordable coverage. As costs go down -- if those costs, and this is important. if those costs are actually recovered, those savings are actually recovered, then they can be put into more people getting coverage --

THE COURT: No, no, I understand that, and it makes -- I understand the economics and that makes sense. But I'm -- as I understand it, the burden is on the carriers to negotiate these savings - negotiate with the hospitals,

1 that the lower cost shifting - rate of cost shifting and bad debt and so forth is going to result in savings. What I don't - what I'm

unclear on is what if the hospitals say hey, great, we're going to increase our profit

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MR. DITRE: I mean --

THE COURT: Is that the marketolace that - that - the bill anticipates - the law anticipates would take place?

MR. DITRE: Yes, it does. It anticipates 12 that there will be a negotiation between the providers and the payers. And the payers include more than just the insurers. For example, third-party administrators are also included in that. But it does anticipate that marketplace dynamic of recovering the savings in order to bring down costs.

18 19 THE COURT: Thank you. 20 MR. DITRE: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Roach.

22 MR. ROACH: Yes, thank you, Your Honor, 23 THE COURT: When does a motion for

continuance -- when is it a procedural order and

when is it a failure to act?

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MR. ROACH: Well, I think there -- they are somewhat distinct, depending on the process. Your Honor. I think a motion to continue, if it's in the context of a statutorily permitted period of time, but a party could say I've been prejudiced by that continuance, again that would be a -- an action that would be -- that would 8 need to be final agency action under 11,001 Sub 9 1.

Here, however, we have - in addition to the -- what they've deemed to be the action of granting the motion to continue, we have the inaction of complying with statutory deadline and holding the hearing and issuing the determination of aggregate measurable costs. Those are distinct.

The argument posited by the respondents in this case is circular. It would -- there would be no situation in which an agency would be subject to any type of review. It would simply need to issue some kind of decision, some kind of decision saying, I've decided in my judgment not to comply with the statutory deadline. It could be as simple as that. And that would be unreviewable by this Court?

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2 And in fact when they say we haven't 3 cited to cases that are - that are similar to this, I would point the Court to Concannon. Concannon, in which they were in the middle of a 6 process for determining a certificate of need, 7 it was in the middle of that process.

And I would -- and I would also point out to the Court that in that particular case, the statute itself allowed for an extension of the statutory deadline. Notwithstanding that, the courts - and I'll just quote Justice Studstrup, the Superior Court has clear statutory jurisdiction to consider the petition and intervening events have not yet rendered the petition moot.

17 That's precisely on point with our current situation, Your Honor. And I would 18 19 submit that if -- that if the Court were to accept the methodology or the interpretation 20 21 posited by the respondents, they would be able to escape any type of review of inaction from 22 this point forward. 23

24 The Court then has asked the question of well, when does it become - I guess to put it 25

differently, when would we be prejudiced by this, when would we --

THE COURT: Well, if April 1 is no harm, no foul, then when does the harm take place?

MR. ROACH: And, Your Honor, 1 think -although our view is that that's not the right - necessarily the right inquiry,

certainly we're prejudiced now. That's why we filed this lawsuit now. They would have you

9 10 take a rather simplistic view of this, which is

to say, well, they're not going to impose the 11

savings offset payment, you know, potentially 12

until next year. Don't worry, this is a long 13

process, multiple. Steps, this is going to take 14 awhile, you don't need to get entangled in this.

15 16 Your Honor, it's a long process for a reason.

And their argument actually is -- is --17

remarkably misapprehends what happens in a rate 18 19 making process.

You cannot impose a savings offset payment in March or April of year one and have already collected that savings offset payment from rate payers. There is supposed to be a match. The savings offset payment may be

collected in the appropriate year rates. By way

1 of example, the savings offset payment for 2006

has been imbedded in premium rates for 2006. So

there is a match with the dollars that you are

collecting from members in the form of premiums

and in the dollars that are being paid to the 5

Dirigo Health Agency in the form of savings 6

offset payments. The suggestion that there

doesn't need to be a match between those two

is -- completely misses the point, not only of

practicality and of what the statutes require, 10

but also have what their own act requires. 11

Their own act requires them to -- to meet 12 certain deadlines I would submit for a reason. 13

And in fact that reason is highlighted by the 14

fact that when the legislature amended this 15

particular statute, it used to just say, by 16

April they have to hold a hearing and issue the 17

aggregate measurable savings determination. Now

it says April 1st. The suggestion that the 19

legislature didn't know what it was doing. 20

that's not a suggestion that the Court is 21

22 allowed to accept, frankly.

There are -- there is an adjudicatory process here in front of the Dirigo Health

Agency Board that requires an end on April 1st.

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It then allows them 30 days to get the

information supporting their decision and the

decision itself to the superintendent so that he

can hold his adjudicatory process. All of this

is again toward reaching a final determination 5

of aggregate measurable cost savings that only 6

then can lead to the savings offset payment. 7

None of this work can happen until they issue

their determination of aggregate measurable cost 9

savings. And the suggestion that we can just 10 wait --

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THE COURT: When do you need to know the savings offset?

MR. ROACH: We need to know the savings offset essentially by around August 1, because that's when we include the savings offset in our -- in our rates in filings before the Bureau of Insurance. Those -- those rates -- and we've set all this, if I could direct the Court, we've set all this out in a time line that's contained within our -- our petitioner's brief. We've explained what it is that we need and when.

22 When you back up, Your Honor, from those 24 dates by which we need the information, it's remarkable how - how consistent that is with

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requirement to make its determination by April 1st.

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And again, we are not suggesting that 3 they are -- we, petitioner Anthem, are not suggesting that they are forever limited by the information that they present by April 1st. There is an adjudicatory process in front of the 7 superintendent that lasts six weeks. There will 8 be prefiled testimony, there will be evidence, there will in all likelihood be some form of 10 discovery. There will then be an adjudicatory 13 process in front of the superintendent, all of 12 that culminating in the superintendent issuing a 13 determination of aggregate measurable cost 14 15 savings.

Now they point to last year. Last year, Your Honor, the process was different under the statute and chaotic. For anyone who was involved in that proceeding to suggest that no harm, no foul is - is - one can understand the ends that they're trying to meet here. But 22 that's -- it's ridiculous to suggest that last year was an appropriate period of time. The statute sets out the appropriate period of time.

THE COURT: What about Mr. Ditre's

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comment of there being no motivation for this 1 Board to delay? I mean it doesn't serve -- that it doesn't serve the purpose of the Dirigo Act 3 to delay these decisions? I guess by the same token, what is the sanction? What is the penalty that Dirigo Agency must suffer if they 7 do not meet the deadline?

MR. ROACH: Okay. I'll answer them -I'll answer them in the order that you've asked them.

10 What is their motivation? It's difficult 11 12 obviously to speculate about another party's motivation in doing - in taking any action. 13 14 But I would submit, Your Honor, that it is revealed in their response to our motion. Their 15 response to our motion, for reasons unknown to 16 me, focuses on whether or not insurance carriers 17 can include the insurance offset payment in 18 rates. The later they make the aggregate 19 measurable cost savings determination, the more 20 21 it prejudices our ability to include it without creating significant customer confusion, without 22

infringing on our ability to go and have the 23 24 appropriate rate proceedings and without having

25 it, for example, be necessary to go to the

legislature to allow an emergency amendment that is going to allow us to truncate the notice 2 provisions to policyholders.

Make no mistake about it. Your Honor, the 4 goal here is to get as high an aggregate measurable cost saving as possible and have as little of that passed through into rates as possible, notwithstanding the statutory construct. Mr. Ditre said, that's not true, we're not talking about that here, they're 10 talking about that over at the legislature. 11 would suggest, Your Honor, that there is --12 there would be no reason for LD-16 - 1635, 13 which is the provision that would prevent pass 14 through of the savings offset payment if what 15 they said was accurate. Statute allows a pass 16 through. I understand the rate changing 17 methodologies and would be happy to explain it to the Court, about why it is that that 19

necessarily has to follow, if you're interested, 20 but the suggestion that -- that somehow there is 21

no harm here as long as they tell us, you know,

sometime in March what we've got to pay for the 23 savings offset payment in April is fundamentally 24

wrong. There is a match between premium rates

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and the savings offset payment necessarily. We collect it in rates. In fact I - it's

imbedded - it's imbedded in the very rates. 4

I would -- and, Your Honor, this isn't a my position versus Mr. Ditre or my position versus Ms. Wyman. I've enclosed for the Court's review, to the extent you'd like, a copy of the superintendent's decision from last year, in which he makes absolutely clear that that's absolutely how the statute works. He went through the analysis, he found that Anthem had used its best efforts to recover the savings offset payment in negotiated premiums, in negotiated rates with the providers, therefore they were able to include that in rates. The statute has a construct that allows that to 16 17 occur.

And I would submit any real delay here -we've suggested a -- a schedule that will allow the DHA Board to go forward now, will allow them to provide the information that they can now and to talk through their methodologies, and then move along to the superintendent, at which time they can put in or attempt to put in whatever

information they deem to be relevant.

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That process, to the extent -- to the extent there's any dilemma at all, that process is the answer. The answer is not to wait -- to have the tip off here while the DHA Board holds the ball in the locker room. You have to start the process. It has to start, because it can't continue, it can't go forward without that.

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I do know that the Court asked some auestions --

THE COURT: The second part was what's the penalty.

MR. ROACH: What is the penalty? Your 12 Honor, I don't know that there is a penalty in 13 14 the statute. My view is that - that it's within -- it's within the context of the statute 15 that there is a requirement that they hold the 16 April -- that they hold to April 1st. Read in 17 18 light of the -- of this particular Court's determination in McGee, it's hard to find that 19 shall determine aggregate measurable cost 20 savings not later than April 1st isn't mandatory 21 under 1 M.R.S.A. Section 71. 22

23 I'll put that to the side, though, 24 because I think that's certainly a strong indicia that it's mandatory. But putting that

to the side, if it's directory, they don't get 1 to ignore it. Again, under Concannon, they 2 don't get to ignore it. It's not a 3 discretionary call, it is you must go forward 4 now. We have suggested in our petition, in our 5 6 briefs, in our briefs below, what the process ought to be in an orderly way that doesn't 7 prejudice us substantially, is in compliance with the statute and allows them to present the 9 information that they feel that they need to 10 present. That is the appropriate work around 11 here. 12

The Court asked questions earlier of Mr. Ditre and there were some answers given regarding the particulars of the data. What data are we looking at here. If I could beg the Court's indulgence, Mr. Stiles is more familiar with the actual data, so if wants to address that --

THE COURT: Well, let me -- I was contradicting my own instructions in getting some of those questions, and let me ask at this point, because I think it's really important in a matter of this magnitude.

This hearing was set as I say for the

procedural issue of determining whether there was jurisdiction. What did you get, four days notice? At the most five days? What is your position with respect to a hearing on the merits -- once I determine the jurisdictional question, what is your position on a hearing on the merits? Is this -- have you had a sufficient opportunity to brief and argue the merits of your position at this proceeding?

MR. ROACH: In our view, Your Honor, and I am speaking only for Anthem --

THE COURT: I understand. 12

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MR. ROACH: - we feel like we have 13 briefed the issue and have argued it with the 14 Court's indulgence today. 15

THE COURT: Okay. I need to ask all parties, because I'm not going to close this record until everybody has had a chance to fully brief the issue. And if you want to write -provide further briefs after this proceeding, I want to give everybody an opportunity to do it. Any of the petitioners, Mr. Frink?

MR. FRINK: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 agree with Mr. Roach. On behalf of the Maine Association of Health Plans, we requested

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expedited treatment, we've briefed what we consider to be the issues in this case collectively, individually, the other side has had a chance to file briefs.

5 Frankly I view this as a -- I'm a little confused in my own mind about the concepts of 8 the merits in this case, this is a procedural appeal on a procedural question, we're not dealing at all with the underlying substance of 9 10 the determination of the aggregate measurable cost savings or anything to do with the details 11 of how that should be calculated, we're only 12 dealing with whether there should be a hearing 13 under a statutory deadline that ended six days 14 ago on April 1st. That's the issue. It's a 15 16 procedural problem.

It's frankly, with all due respect, a gross mischaracterization of -- by the agency, by the Board of what it's done here. They have flaunted the deadline. There are things going on in the legislature that certainly have a bearing on -- on this whole program. There is clearly a situation where our clients, both Anthem and the other health plans, will be aggrieved if this is delayed. It was a very

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difficult damaging process last year, in terms of relationships between carriers and their customers to have to develop rates, under a 3 statutory deadline that was different last year, we had to live with that, and we did, but it was difficult. And it was very - it was damaging. And I belive that to some extent there may be 7 some intent here that that should continue again this year and create hardship and disruption in the insurance market while the legislature 10 continues to debate these issues. And I think 11 that for the -- for a Board not to step forward 12 and acknowledge that is troubling. I think that 13 the - the fact that this agency ignores the 14

is very troubling. t don't think that this case raises any issues about the merits. I think this case is ready for decision. And I think that frankly the agency needs to be given like - it's an exceptional situation, but this is a case where I believe, Your Honor, the Court has an important role to play in upholding the rule of law that applies not only to private citizens but also to state agencies.

statute that it is responsible for administering

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misimpression, that they can't possibly -couldn't possibly have met their obligation to hold a hearing, let me shatter that myth.

The sole reason that they have given for continuing this hearing is that cost reports. medicare cost reports for hospitals with a fiscal year that ends on 12/31 will not be available until they are filed, which by medicare law requires no later than five months after the end of their fiscal year, so we're talking about May 31st at the latest.

The DHA recently filed its methodologies and it has identified only four initiatives for this year. I believe that Mr. Ditre said something about operating margins. That is not one of the initiatives that they are pursuing this year, there are only four. One is the certificate of need. There is no certificate of need information in any medicare cost report. It is irrelevant to that issue.

He also - the -- another issue is the hospital or physician fee initiatives. This is based on a time value of money. There is no hospital physician fee initiative information in a medicare cost report. And if you don't

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State agencies are not in a position to rewrite statutes and they should comply with them and that's what this hearing is all about. I think the record is clear, what the facts are, what the relevant case law, what the statutory law is. And I think the sooner that we can receive the Court's guidance as to how the law should be interpreted and applied, not only by private parties but by the state agency in question, the better. So I thank you for your time.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Frink. Anyone else?

MR. STILES: Justice Marden, good morning. I will be brief. William Stiles with -- on behalf of the Maine State Chamber of Commerce.

I think it's important to realize why we're here. And the question should be when can an agency disregard a clear and unambiguous statutory directive. And the reason that I'm here today is because there seemed to be some suggestion that the agency could not go forward with its case by April 1. And to the extent that the Court is under that misunderstanding or

believe me, you can look at their own methodology, where they identify the date elements necessary for that. They do not identify medicare cost reports. So that leaves 4 only two. The cost per case mix adjusted discharge issue and the bad debt charity care savings initiative. 8

Now, there is a line in the medicare cost report that covers bad debt and charity care. However, in last fall's hearing, the agency already captured all of the savings for calendar year 2005, which is the exact same period 12 covered by the cost reports that they say they 13 need for the upcoming period. So it cannot be relevant to bad debt charity care, they're measuring 2006. We would have to wait until 16 June 1 of 2007 to get the relevant information. And I would submit to you that the legislature could not have intended to - for them to use 19 information that could not possibly be ready by 20 the time they are supposed to issue their 22 decision.

So that leaves only the cost per CMAD. 23 This methodology in their - in their recent 24 filing that identifies the methodologies for 25

year two, they say they are going to rely on the vear one methodologies. In year one they had a spreadsheet with all of the hospitals costs in there, starting with the fiscal year 2000. 5 ending with fiscal year 2004. There are 6 formulas in there that take the numbers from the 7 cost report and out comes a number that they say 8 is savinos.

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The only thing that they have to do is add another column for 2005. There are only eight of 36 hospitals in the State of Maine that 12 they are measuring that have a fiscal year that ends on 12/31. All of the other cost reports are available and have been available for some time, yet they have not updated their spreadsheet.

17 And we're not talking about sophisticated 18 maneuvering here. We are talking about data 19 entry. This is not something that takes a lot 20 of time. We're talking about cost reports. 21 According to their testimony from the last 22 hearing, there are data fields where they enter 23 certain data from a cost report, cost reports 24 are big and thick and confusing, however, they are aligned by worksheets, worksheets A through

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S, and columns and lines. And so for each data entry, and they're only pulling maybe a half dozen or 10 data entries from the cost report. we know which line to go to, which number to pull, and all you do is take that number and put it in the cost report.

So these cost reports will become available. The methodology that they're producing, this formula, can be tested at a hearing where almost 90 plus percent of the data through 2005 is available. When we get before 11 the superintendent, the numbers will be 12 available, they just put them in. This is exactly what happened at the superintendent's hearing last year. We debated the numbers and the superintendent based on his decision input new numbers into the same spreadsheet.

What they're not telling you about the cost per CMAD issue is that in the first year, first assessment year, last fall's hearing, the sole basis for including the CMAD savings was because hospitals were covered by a voluntary limit in the increase of cost. So that the law asks providers out of the goodness of their hearts to hold cost increases to no more than

3.5 percent on a -- when measured by a cost per case mix adjusted discharge, and that's what i

referred to as CMAD. That voluntary limit

expired on June 30, 2004. The period that they

intend to measure starts July 1, 2004, and

extends to June 30, 2005. There is no voluntary

limit in the law to be measured, so there's no

reason to wait for medicare cost reports.

I would suggest to the Court in light of 10 the fact that although we have the spreadsheets, we have over 90 percent of the data available. 11 12 there -- and they can either input proxy numbers 13 or leave numbers blank, that the real reason for 14 the continuance is that either they're 15 unprepared or they don't want to show us the 16 numbers and the calculations until they put all 17 of the numbers in there, because they may want to change the methodology when they get the

19 actual numbers because it may not produce enough

20 savings. And again, if you don't believe me,

21 you can look at their own methodology. On page

22 9 of the methodology, they say that once we get

23 the numbers, we may have to make some

refinements to the methodologies. Your Honor, 74

25 either the methodologies are reasonable in and

of themselves, which can be tested at a hearing that could start on Monday, or they are not. 3 The only reason for the delay is to give them a chance to change the methodologies to meet their budgeting needs. Thank you,

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Gerrity. MR. GERRITY: I'll be very brief, Your Honor, and I'll try to bring this around if I can, sort of back around the barn.

There - there maybe isn't a member of the Superior Court sitting who has more appreciation for the legislative process than do you. This bill --

THE COURT: Appreciation is an interesting word.

MR. GERRITY: Well, and I chose that word carefully. I am sure you are aware that when this statute was enacted in 2003, that didn't happen in a vacuum. I was there, Mr. Ditre was there, Anthem was there, everybody and his 21 brother was there. The legislature worked on it for months and went through all the things we 23 have all experienced in a legislative action. You know, there's real truth to the saying that two things you don't want to see made are

sausage and legislation.

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2 The legislature made a decision and it set a time frame in place, and it said by April in 2003 we want the decision on what the aggregate measurable cost savings are from the Board. Well, then two years follow in which all of that mechanism is out in place. It took time to create the agency, to fund the agency, to get 8 human beings in the agency, to work out a 9 10 contract with Anthem to be its -- one of its 11 contracting partners, to do all the stuff 12 necessary to start.

Then in 2005, as almost inevitably happens, they had to amend the statute. 15 Everybody showed up. Everybody argued. 16 Everybody bickered. A committee was set up to work on it. And by golly, the legislature after hearing all that came back and said, not only do we want the decision in April, we want the decision by April 1st.

Now, this is an agency that has a real problem with appreciating the distinction between itself and the legislature. It is the legislature that gets to set these time frames. It is the legislature that out of this whole

maelstrom of the public policy debate made that 2 decision and this agency has to respect it. Not 3 only has the agency not respected it, the agency 4 has said, the heck with it, we're not just going 5 to be late by a week or two or three, we want to wait at least four and a half months to hold the 6 hearing, or give ourselves that much time to 8 hold the hearing, and then maybe wait another 30 9 days to render a decision. They can't do that.

10 And the only reason we're here is to ask 11 you to do one of two things. Either tell them that because you missed the April 1st deadline 12 13 you're out of luck, wait until next year, or if 14 the Court chooses not to do that and interpret 15 the statute as less than absolutely mandatory. 16 but -- but somewhat directory, say to them, you 17 know something agency, April 1st did mean something. You can't come in here with circular 18 19 logic that says because we made the decision to 20 not do something, that's a decision and therefore we're not doing nothing, which is the 21 silliest argument I've ever heard. You tell 22 23 them, you don't get to ignore this. Go out, go forth, do your business. And if you don't like

the result that comes down, then go right back

over to the state house and tell the insurance

and Financial Services Committee and the speaker

and the president of the senate and the governor

this doesn't work, please fix it for us. But

don't let them establish their own rules of the

game completely in derogation of the statute.

Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Wyman.

MS. WYMAN: I really have --

THE COURT: You tell Mr. Laubenstein that 10 11

he did you a big favor.

12 MS. WYMAN: I am so happy to be here.

13 Your Honor.

> I don't even -- I'm -- I don't even know where to start. I feel like we've waded so far into merits that it really goes so far beyond what this Court really can do today.

The -- if you read the recommended decision that was adopted by the Board, it deals with the issue. I do take offense to the characterization of the Board as having ignored the statutory deadline. It did not ignore the statutory deadline. In fact it recognized that it had to deal with that deadline. And it made a determination that it could not properly do

the measurable cost savings determination

without the medicare cost reports that don't

come out until the end of June. It's all on the 3

recommended decision as adopted by the Board.

The Board is making a good faith effort to

interpret the statute and make it work.

They -- you know, with all due respect to 7 these guys sitting here, they would love to see 9 the agency forced to do measurable cost savings 10 on the data that it has now. This is not a 11 simple matter of plugging in numbers. This is using numbers that have been - that are part of 13 this third party report that represent 17 . 14 million dollars potentially in savings. To 15 suggest that somehow they ignore that and then allow the superintendent of insurance, which 17 under the statute is only allowed to review the 18 determination made by the Board, not allowed to 19 do the fact finding, then the Board would not be 20 doing what it needs to do, which is to make sure

Now, I want to address one issue that the 23 Court had when -- the question that the Court had, what is the penalty. If the Board fails to act in a timely fashion, there will not be a

that this program works.

1 program - there will not be any determination 2 of rate savings or anything, it will come -there will be no rates determined for 2007. So the Board has to act. And in the recommended decision, it states that it has to -- to have 6 this hearing by August 15th, which gives the parties enough time to respond to the 8 information that comes in on those medicare cost 9 reports. 10

THE COURT: But isn't that one of the arguments for April 1st?

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MS. WYMAN: Well, there's been a lot of I'd like to call it testimony today about what the legislature was thinking. There's nothing in the record that indicates what that date really meant. It is the agency and the Board's decision that is - that looked at that April 1st deadline and said it is directory, not mandatory. They would love to have this Court come in and second quess that.

Our argument today is that that issue has been very thoroughly preserved for appellate review after the case is over. And we have no doubt that they will ask for -- for the Court to review that decision. But it's not before -

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it's not before the Court properly today. The 1 only issue before the Court today is whether -and they do have the right to ask this Court to look at that, is whether the nonfinal action on the part of the Board to allow a continuance to the agency, so that it can have the crucial information it needs to do a determination. the same information that it had last year when 9 it - when it did this process and that it

10 needed last year to do a determination. 11 And on that point, Your Honor, I would 12 like to point out, they did - last year they 13 dld not have a decision from the superintendent 14 of insurance until October 29th. The process moved forward and they apparently were able to 15 16 get their rates in place before the time they needed. Now, I know they're saying how chaotic 17 18 it was and how horrible it was. We would love the process to run smoother. There was a real 19 effort here on the Board's - on the agency and 20 21 the Board's part to try to get this hearing held before April 1st. They simply could not do it 22

not be available until it summer. And they will 24

without the information they needed, that will

hold a hearing as soon as they have that

information.

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THE COURT: But you're telling me the 2 Board is saying that April 1st is an impossibility, that it is a nullity, that you cannot implement the statute.

MS. WYMAN: No. that's not what it's 6 saying. What the Board made a determination is that that provision in the law was directory, and that to the extent that they - they attempted to honor it, they did, but they could not in order to be able to fully implement the 11 program as it was intended to be implemented. 12

THE COURT: Well, I guess that's my question, ma'am. Isn't the Board saying they can't implement the program with an April 1st deadline? I mean is it going to be any different next year or the information --

MS. WYMAN: They have to seek a 18 legislative solution. But in order to get a 19 20 cost savings for 2007, they simply must hold the hearing after they have the medicare cost 21 reports in order to do a full - to do the 22 23 determination accurately.

THE COURT: So if the legislature takes no action, the same situation is going to be

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1 created next year.

> MS, WYMAN: I have no idea what the how the Board plans to deal with this on a long term basis. It's been -- I will agree with this. This has been a difficult statute to implement from day one. It's extremely complicated. These parties are still arguing about the methodology from last year. There's no question that the litigation around this will swirt for years to come.

But to -- to deny the Board the right to interpret the statute the way it believes it has to in order to effect legislative intent, which was to pass savings on to consumers, they can't ignore their responsibility because of one date in the statute.

> THE COURT: But --MS. WYMAN: And that's --

THE COURT: But getting back to my question, ma'am. If as has been described to me these medicare cost reports are not available 22 until May, hasn't the Board made its decision. that under no circumstances can they reach a decision by April 1st? And if there's no legislative relief, then in effect the deadline

is a nullity.

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MS. WYMAN: No. that's not what they determined. In its decision it determined that it would use the statutory date as a directory date. And it followed the case law that said that there are times when you have to look at those dates and not determine that they are mandatory, and that -- that they're jurisdictional, and that's the position that the Board took.

And with all due respect, Your Honor, I don't even think that issue is before the Court. I think it it's -- that issue clearly will be an issue on appeal when it's final agency action. So in essence that's it in a nut.

THE COURT: We're not talking about grocery stores here, ma'am, we're talking about --

MS. WYMAN: No, I understand, but what we are talking about is if the Court were to force the -- the Board to go forward, it would not have the information that it needed in order to do the measurable cost savings correctly, and it would mean that the process would move forward with faulty information, which I - talk about

example, could it make a decision by April 1st

of next year? Absolutely. How would it do

that? It could possibly use trend factors

rather than actual data. It could say,

healthcare costs are going up by such and such

an amount, therefore we predict that as of next

year, we project for what those amounts would

be. This is not something that will occur, it

could. But in essence that could be fixed.

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The second point is that when the

11 petitioners come before you and say, look what

12 happened last year, how the legislature had to

change the deadlines, yes, because at their

request, they filed a piece of legislation, 14

LD-1577, that the Insurance and Financial 15

Services Committee adopted, which did two things

17 that put off the dates. They at the request of

the insurance companies basically included a 18

savings offset payment working group that 19

20 convened on June the 30th and finished its

deliberations I think sometime at the end of 21

22 August, That pushed back the other dates. So

23 the committee actually - the Insurance and

Financial Services Committee actually changed

the dates in the statute. If they wanted to 25

motives, perhaps that's a motive here, and then 1

2 it would result in few if any savings for the

consumers and that would not serve the program.

And that was the determination that the Board

made in - in the -- for the benefit of the 5

program and for the consumers in Maine. And 6

the - the agency and the Board are entitled to

8 some deference in how they interpret the

9 statute. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Ditre.

MR. DITRE: Your Honor, I just want to 12 sort of back up and really get to where we're at, because the agency began its proceeding, it had prefiled testimony, it had prefiled briefs. all the parties have basically briefed the issue, they provided proposed methodology for calculating the savings, we've got designation of witnesses, we've got expert witness and

18 prefiled expert testimony. So the agency began 19 to do what it could do. 20

21 Your question regarding the April 1st 22

deadline and will this recur every year, I would posit possibly not. And it all hinges on a factual determination that the Board has made in

24 25 terms of what data does it need. So, for

all years forward, when they had that bill

before them they could have said, we're going to

make this a mandatory deadline for this year and

impose some sort of penalty for not meeting this

date. They chose not to do that.

You heard one of the petitioners say they 6 changed it from April to April the 1st. Well, 7

if the legislature was so moved to change and 8

require that this had to be completed by April

10 the 1st, period, then they would have put a

11 hammer in the statute and said if you don't do

12 this, this is - this is analogous to the case

that you just decided on the texpayer 13

14 collection, in which you said there was no --

15 that the - that the petitions were invalid,

that was the penalty in the statute if you went 16

17 beyond a year, they were invalid. Here they

didn't say that at all. They recognized that

19 this is a complicated proceeding and they left

20 it to the discretion of the agency. In fact in

addition, they gave all powers necessary and

22 convenient, were convenient to effectuate the

23 purposes of this act.

> Why - I mean the penalty, you've asked that question several times, what is the

penalty? The penalty is that the entire purpose 1 of the Dirigo Health Agency, of providing 2 affordable, comprehensive, subsidized health insurance, would be frustrated. In fact it would be destroyed if they didn't make this decision. There is no interest in the agency to 6 7 avoid making the decision here or to delay this.

THE COURT: So you're saying that the savings offset for '06 would not automatically trans - become the savings offset for '07 if there is no action under this statute?

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MR. DITRE: If they don't -- if they don't determine the savings offset payment this year for next year for the assessment that will fund the program next year, they will have no money to basically provide -- except for any money that carries over after this year ends.

THE COURT: So you're saying there would be no assessment, you wouldn't -- you would not continue with the assessment rate that has been established for --

22 MR. DITRE: Exactly. They have to do 23 this annually, Your Honor. Section 6913(1) requires a -- that's 24-A. Title 24-A. Section 24 25 6913(1), requires annually to determine the

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cost, the aggregate measurable cost savings and then 6913, Sub 2, requires them to determine the assessment after the superintendent makes his decision. So yeah, there would be -- in essence with the exception of any carry over of remaining funds from this year, there would be no funds for the subsidies for -- that enable people to get the health coverage that they need.

I think that in the interest of economy, what the Board said was - they made a factual determination that they didn't have the information. And I would disagree with the characterization of how easy it is to basically plug numbers into a data sheet. We had Mercer, Governmental Human Services Consulting, a worldwide consulting firm, we had Lewin Worldwide Consulting, basically representing the 18 interests of each of the - I think the Chamber had Lewin and I think Dirigo Health Agency had Mercer, they also had a world class financial analyst basically involved in this. These are

not simple calculations. It's not like you can

plug numbers in. For example, of the nine

hospitals that they testified that was in the

medicare reports available to us, two of them are among the largest hospitals. So it might be a small number of hospitals but the amount of 3 money is huge. So it's -- it's not simple.

And I think that - I quess what I'm 5 asking is that the agency has made a factual 6 7 determination that they needed more information, 8 and they did not abuse their discretion, there 9 is no abuse of discretion, that they have the 10 inherent authority and broad discretion, I mean Volume II of American Jurisprudence Second 11 Edition 335 basically says administrative 12 13 agencies have inherent authority and broad discretion in granting or denying motions to continue. I don't think they abused their 15 16 discretion here. I think that they basically 17 are saying we need more information. And it's not just the medicare cost reports. 18 19

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. MR. DITRE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, I asked if anybody wanted more time to argue the merits and they've arqued the merits, which is fine. Mr. Roach, you wanted to say something.

MR. ROACH: Yes, Your Honor, just very

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briefly, a couple of points. We've heard now,

Your Honor, for the first time, at least to my

knowledge, that they would be capable of making

4 this determination by April 1st if they use

different data, if they use trend factors. I

would posit the question why didn't they? If

that data is available, perhaps it's not crucial

that they have the medicare cost information

9 that they say they need. Secondly --

THE COURT: I'm assuming he meant trend data under this statute, which would mean -- how old is it, one year?

MR. ROACH: It would have to be - I would assume it would have to be not trend data of what the state's offset payment was but rather trend data related to hospital costs, which is all historical. It's the same - it's the same trend data that Anthem, for example. uses in rate proceedings every year and is not - is not some newly crafted trend data.

The other suggestion is that - that 22 again, it's been repeated last year we waited until October 29th and Anthem got it into the rates, got the SOP into rates. Again, I - I guess I have to repeat that Anthem had to get special dispensation from the -- from the notice requirements within the statute to allow a truncated notice period to policyholders.

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The other piece that I would point out, Your Honor, is that last year's Health Choice rates were implemented in March. This is -this is not a process that occurs overnight, for obvious reasons. We couldn't implement the rates until March. They were effective January 1st. So Anthem was able to recoup a full 12 months worth of premiums, but they weren't implemented until March.

Well, what's the practical outflow of that? Every consumer that purchases Anthem's individual products, which numbers in the range of 35,000 Maine consumers, received a higher monthly amount starting in March than they otherwise would have, because if it had been spread out over 12 months, the increase would have been less.

That is certainly not what the legislature envisioned in any of these requirements for Maine insurance companies. it's not a practice that the bureau certainly appreciates. They would like the rates to be

But there is a body of law in which the Law

Court has clearly set some considerations that

must be given as to whether or not the deadlines in the statute are mandatory or directory and

whether or not that issue is -- is properly

before the Court. McGee of course was a

constitutional context which had its own influence with respect to that decision.

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It seems to the Court, without making a decision at this stage of the game, that the implication of 11,001, Sub 2, stands by itself, except the standard must be whether or not the failure to take action for reasons which have been justified by the agency was for good and sufficient reason and whether or not it affects the legal rights - whether it has an effect over and above simply being a violation of a procedural rule.

I - I mention that at this point simply to raise the possibility that if the Court is satisfied from a further reading of the briefs and the cases that that requires evidence, it would be -- it feels it would be obligated to have a - have an evidentiary hearing. And so just be aware that -- and there will be no delay

effective on the date that they're implemented. 1

Any suggestion -- if the Court were to agree

3 that they can simply put off this hearing in the

4 way that they suggested, the same thing will happen. The rates will not be implemented on

time, we'll have delays, and it's not in

accordance with the statute.

What we've heard them argue is this isn't mandatory. There is no penalty. What I would suggest to the Court is even if it's directory, they are required to hold a hearing. That's what the law requires, they haven't addressed that, they should be ordered to hold a hearing and make their determination. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody want to submit any more writing or do we close it and a decision be made?

MR. ROACH: None for Anthem, Your Honor, unless we receive any -- any other writings that we need to respond to.

THE COURT: Okay. The -- it was 22 interesting receiving this on top of the McGee decision. And quite frankly, when I first addressed the McGee decision, I thought it was a slam dunk based upon Title 1 and Title 21-A.

in making that determination if the Court feels

that there must be an evidentiary hearing to

determine those issues, it will put out a

scheduling order accordingly, and hopefully with

a status conference to determine availability

for all parties. I -- I recognize -- for the

very same reasons this action is here, promptly

filed after April 1st, the Court realizes that a

decision must be made in a timely fashion and it 10

will handle it accordingly.

With that, in spite of all of the 12 argument, it's really nice to see you all again. It brings back some great memories. Court will be in recess.

(10:12 A.M.)

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CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct
transcript of my stenographic notes of the testimony
and proceedings taken in the above-captioned case.
Janette L. Cook
Official Court Reporter
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